NA by Grant, Charles Wayne
(THE EFFECT OF MATERIAL SHORTAGES ON PRODUCTION






THE EFFECT OF MATERIAL SHORTAGES ON PRODUCTION




Th asis Advisor: A. W. McMasters
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
T1896






2. GOVT Accession NO. *. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG HuutCD
4. TITLE (and Submit)
The Effect of Material Shortages on Production
At the Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda
S. TYRE OF REPORT a RERIOO COVEREO
Master's Thesis;
September 1979
• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMIM
7. AUTHOR'*;
Charles Wayne Grant
• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER'*.)
• PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
41
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (oi Ihlm r.frorrj
Unclassified
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 AOORESSCIf dtllormnt Iron Controlling Olllcm,
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
HI. OECL ASSI Fl CATION/ DOWN GRAOIN G
SCHEDULE
14. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (oi Ihlm Roport)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol Ma a*a«r«el mntmtod In Block 20. II dlttormnt from Report)
IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES




20. ABSTRACT (Continue on ravaraa aide II nocoeemrr end Idontttr by block member)
As a result of the Department of Defense Material Distribution Study, the Navy
has begun to consolidate the wholesale inventories held at the Naval Air Sta-
tion, Alameda and at the Navy Supply Center, Oakland. Due to this consolidation,
the support responsibility for the Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, will shift
from the Naval Air Station, Alameda to the Naval Supply Center, Oakland. This
support involves the positioning of stock, the requisition processing and status




EDITION OF I MOV «t IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0103-014-S601 I
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Doto Entered)

Planning for such support requires an examination of the industrial activity
itself: the production processes involved, the policies and procedures that
govern material movement, and material supply problems currently faced by pro-
duction personnel. Research revealed that material shortages were a significant
cause of production delays and inefficiencies. Material shortage induced delays
also were found to have an impact on the material pipeline and on customer
units. Finally, the level of material support provided to the Air Rework
Facility is documented and recommendations as to changes to that service are
offered.
DD Form 1473
1 Jan 73 2
S/N 0102-014-6601 sieuaiTv claudication or tni$ *Aotr"»«« o«

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
THE EFFECT OF MATERIAL SHORTAGES ON PRODUCTION
AT THE NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY, AIAMEDA
by
Charles Wayne Grant
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A. , University of Richmond, 1970
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







As a result of the Department of Defense Material Distribution
Study, the Navy has begun to consolidate the wholesale inventories held
at the Naval Air Station, Alameda and at the Navy Supply Center, Oakland.
Due to this consolidation, the support responsibility for the Naval Air
Rework Facility, Alameda, will shift from the Naval Air Station, Alameda
to the Naval Supply Center, Oakland. This support involves the posi-
tioning of stock, the requisition processing and status function, and
the movement of material through the system to the Air Rework Facility.
Planning for such support requires an examination of the industrial
activity itself: the production processes involved, the policies and
procedures that govern material movement, and material supply problems
currently faced by production personnel. Research revealed that mate-
rial shortages were a significant cause of production delays and inef-
ficiencies. Material shortage induced delays also were found to have
an impact on the material pipeline and on customer units. Finally, the
level of material support provided to the Air Rework Facility is docu-
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On 1 October 1979, the Naval Supply Center, Oakland will assume
cognizance of the wholesale inventory now held at the Naval Air Station,
Alameda. This consolidation will involve the Supply Center in, among
other things, the direct support of the Naval Air Rework Facility,
Alameda, a task previously performed by the Air Station.
The Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) is a major Navy industrial
activity. Its major mission areas include depot level aircraft main-
tenance, major aircraft structural repair, component and ground sup-
port equipment maintenance, aircraft engine overhaul, and depot level
missile maintenance.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
A major objective of the consolidation planning was to ensure that
the level of service experienced by the activities in Alameda would not
be in any way degraded by the consolidation. This thesis research was
performed to document the production characteristics of NARF Alameda,
and to attempt to determine the level of service required to properly
support that activity. More specifically, an attempt was made to deter-
mine the effect material shortages have on its production. If known,
the detrimental impact of a material shortage could then be balanced
against the costs of stock levels and transportation alternatives at
NSC, Oakland as well as NARF, Alameda.
1
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The overall approach was to first document the type of industrial
work performed by the NARF including scheduling, work flow, and problem
areas. Second, material shortage problems were examined to show how
this type of problem is handled by the production personnel and what the
specific costs and other effects may be. Finally, possible changes in
the local delivery response standards were proposed and examined.
In order to do this, three primary sources of data were relied upon:
1. Navy Directives and Instructions. The basis for a great deal
of the daily operations are governed by instructions issued by a wide
range of Navy commands. These instructions establish the policies
and procedures which the operating units follow.
2. NARF, Alameda Reports and Records. The accounting records
provide actual data as to the costs of production as well as performance
measures
.
3. Interviews. Since the policies and directives are subject to
interpretation by those who implement them, interviews were held with
production, production control, and material control personnel at dif-
ferent levels at NARF, Alameda and at NAS
,
Alameda.
In addition, during the research, it became evident that actual
data was not available to adequately describe some aspeets of the prob-
lem. However, the opinion of the individuals concerned will hopefully
provide some indication of the overall effect of material shortages.

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCTION AND MATERIAL SUPPLY
A. INTRODUCTION
Material supply is one of the key elements of any production process.
A smooth and predictable supply source allows management to lay out
facilities and schedule work in the most effective and efficient manner.
If the supply sources are not secure, the value of the plans and
schedules are negated. In a sense, much of the economy of mass produc-
tion are lost as each supply interruption requires individual solutions
to production problems.
B. THE EFFECT OF A MATERIAL SHORTAGE
Material shortages affect industrial production in two primary areas:
(1) production inefficiencies and delay, and (2) a reduction in output
into the distribution channel.
1. Production Efficiency
Production inefficiencies and delays involve such things as work
stoppages and work-arounds which can adversely impact direct labor costs.
Lack of the proper material at the proper time forces rescheduling of
production work and can result in increased indirect costs for material
expediting, purchase monitoring, and faster transportation.
Material shortages affect NARF, Alameda in much the same manner
as any industrial plant. Each major area, i.e., aircraft maintenance,
component rework, and engine maintenance, has a slightly different organ-
ization and different needs. Each area, therefore, is affected in a
slightly different manner by a shortage. Each area will be addressed
separately in a later chapter.

2 . Material Pipeline
The second effect of a material shortage is a reduction in the
output into the distribution channel. This follows directly from the
inef ficiences and delays discussed above. If output is restricted, less
material is available for sales to its customers.
The Navy distribution channel, or pipeline, consists of total
system assets, including both ready for issue items (RFI) and not ready
for issue (NRFI) items that are awaiting repairs. Given that an inven-
tory manager is striving for a set rate of supply effectiveness, he can
determine the number of RFI items required to support fleet assets.
The RFI portion of the pipeline may therefore be considered to be fixed.
Then it becomes obvious that the pipeline becomes longer as the total
repair time increases. Delays, which increase total repair time, will
directly affect the pipeline.
Material shortages affect the pipeline in several ways. As
with any delay, a material shortage can cause a decrease in the pro-
duction rate by increasing the total time that the item remains unser-
viceable and therefore unavailable for issue to customers. In order to
maintain a given level of supply effectiveness, the inventory manager
must maintain a higher level of system assets than would be necessary
if no production delays existed. The pipeline costs are the investment
costs and holding costs of the level of inventory.
An example of this is found in the component section. As noted
in Exhibit (1) the dollar value of components in "G" condition, over
30 days in delay awaiting parts, at NAS Alameda as of June 197 9 was
nearly $30.0 million. This problem will be discussed in more detail
in a later chapter, but it is clear that the total Navy investment in
10

unserviceable components is substantial. Exactly the same situation
exists in the engine area. At NARF, Alameda over 100 engines are in
delay while awaiting parts.
It may be that aircraft experience a similar pipeline effect.
When evaluating the total number of aircraft needed to support a given
level of operations, it is safe to assume that, at any point in time,
a certain percentage of the aircraft will not be operationally availa-
ble. Some will be experiencing a mechanical failure, others will be
in maintenance, and others still will be in overhaul. For example,
in order to have 90 aircraft combat ready at all times, it may be
necessary to have 100 aircraft in the unit.
Under these circumstances for a given level of fleet readiness,
a reduction in overhaul delays could result in a reduction of the total
aircraft inventory. The savings could be significant. Each A-6E
Intruder aircraft has a flyaway cost of about $10 million. Each F-14
Tomcat has a flyaway cost of more than $20 million. Further savings in
reduced support requirements may also be possible.
Related to these increased pipeline costs are higher system
costs to the customer. If an aircraft, for example, is not completed
on schedule, the squadron that owns that aircraft remains without an
operational asset until it is delivered. While there may not be direct
cost for this delay, there are indirect costs associated with it. Like-
wise, in the case of engines and components, production delays could
result in fleet aircraft remaining not operationally ready for the length
of the delay. Missions may not be performed or may be marginally suc-
cessful. Training may be postponed or cancelled. Total force readiness
and mission capability may be seriously degraded.
11

C. RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS
To examine the effects of operational delays or production, it would
be most desirable to be able to examine production and financial records
and identify the costs associated with each such delay. However, this
type of charge is hard to capture, and is not, in fact, broken out by
the existing accounting system at NARF. Discussions with the Comptrol-
ler's Office revealed that there was very little in the way of actuals
available to document the production effect. Certain delay related
costs are, however, recorded as part of the overhead charges.
In order to provide some degree of information, a more subjective
approach was used. Interviews were held with key personnel in a wide
variety of positions throughout NARF. These discussions represented
the opinion of the individuals involved, and usually were not substan-
tiated by hard data. However, it is hoped that these individual opinions




III. PRODUCTION AT NARF, ALAMEDA
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter each major phase of NARF, Alameda's activity will
be described. It is important to understand the type of work being
performed and the constraints under which the activity operates. Fol-
lowing this description, the levels of service required to properly
support the activity will be considered.
B. AIRCRAFT DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
1 . Description of Maintenance
NARF, Alameda is designated as a maintenance facility for the
A-6, P-3, A-3, S-3, and C-118 series aircraft. During standard depot
level maintenance (SDLM) , each aircraft is inspected and all structural
and equipment related repairs and inspections are conducted. In
addition, the aircraft is normally updated to current standards by
installing any outstanding airframe changes. Workload planning is ac-
complished two quarters in advance and is subject to revision at any
time. However, there has not been a great deal of variability between
the planned workload and the actual final tasking.
Each aircraft series has its own production flow during main-
tenance. For the P-3, C-118, and A-6 aircraft, a line is set up in
one of two hangars and the aircraft physically move through the five
or six stations, or spots, in the line. Each station is assigned
specific tasks to do on each aircraft moving through.
13

The following table shows the major elements of the SDLM and





Structural and Electrical Rework 7 9
Structural and Mechanical Rework 7 9
Mechanical and Electrical Installation 7 9
System Test 7 3
Paint 5 5
Avionics Ground Check 4 3
Flight Test 2 1
Post Flight Test 1 1
TOTAL 57 days 53 days
As the aircraft proceeds through the hangar, it is stripped of
all components scheduled to be repaired or replaced. Items which are
repairable are sent out to the "feeder," or component repair. Although
it varies widely between types of aircraft and individual aircraft
themselves, approximately 400 components would fall into this category.
However, another 900 to 1100 components are removed to provide working
access to the airframe or its components in need of repair. These
"removed for access only" components are stored until that aircraft is
ready to be reassembled. During this time the reworked or new compo-
nents are arriving for eventual installation in the aircraft.
14

The standard procedure is to, as far as possible, reinstall all compo-
nents in the same aircraft from which they were removed.
2. The Effect of a Material Shortage
The aircraft line copes with material shortages through two
forms of cannibalization: diversion, and backrobbing. Diversion is
the reassigning of a ready for issue (RFI) part from one aircraft
(or component or engine) to another. Components removed for access
only and purchased parts are subject to diversion to any other aircraft
that may require them. The aircraft lines use a computer controlled
stacker to store and track these parts until they are needed.
The parts in the stacker, plus the approximately 400 parts
which are being reworked in the feeder shops and the parts ordered
through the supply system, provide a large pool of material which is
available for diversion to other aircraft as needed. Since the parts
are readily available "off the shelf", such diversion has little, if
any, negative impact on production. The only extra work necessary is
the administrative time needed to track the diversion so that, eventually,
each aircraft receives the right parts. The computer that controls the
stacker has been locally programmed to allow for easy diversion, link-
ing, and tracking of parts.
The computer, however, does not keep summary statistics on how
many diversions occur or on the particular parts being diverted. Infor-
mal discussions indicate that such diversions occur from "very frequently"
to "all the time".
Backrobbing differs from diversion in that the parts required
are currently installed on an aircraft and would not be removed except
to satisfy the emergency requirement. There are, therefore, unique and
15

identifiable costs associated with removing the required part and return-
ing a part to replace it. It represents work performed solely because
the supply system could not provide material in time to prevent a work
stoppage. Since these charges would not be appropriately charged to
either the down aircraft or the supplier aircraft, the accounting system
does provide for the accumulation of charges for backrobbing in an
overhead account.
For example, if a completed aircraft is on the flight line for
final predelivery testing, and it suffers a serious engine failure,
it is very likely the NARF will backrob a replacement engine from an
aircraft in process if an RFI engine is not available. It may require
three men one shift to remove the replacement engine and that much more
time to reinstall an engine in that aircraft. Those hours would not
normally be charged to the aircraft job but they would appear in the
indirect account entitled "backrobbing." This account makes up part
of the overhead rate applied to all jobs.
It is not clear just how accurate these accumulated costs are.
Certainly, the example just given is an extreme case. If the backrob-
bing action had required less time, perhaps 0.5 manhours, it is not
likely that the mechanic would go through the administrative trouble
of submitting a new job card for the backrobbing action. As a result,
the backrobbing account will generally contain only charges for the
"major" backrobbing situations. Charges recorded in this account over
a one year period appear as exhibit (2)
.
In addition, the system does not provide information on how
many backrobbing situations occur or exactly where they occur. The
average length of the delay, or the average cost per delay is therefore
16

not available. It was the opinion of the production control personnel
that most of the backrobbing situations involve relatively small charges
and are not recorded anywhere.
In addition to the actual direct labor involved in a backrob,
there are indirect effects. There is an effect on administrative
effort to track the backrob and to plan and arrange for eventual re-
placement. Production schedules for both aircraft (the one with the
material shortage and the one which supplied the replacement part)
may have to be adjusted. Backrobbing can also result in the breakage
of parts or components during the exchange and perhaps even double con-
sumption of materials when items are not properly tracked or when
breakage does occur.
In summary, material shortages have a definite effect on the
aircraft production effort. The flow pattern and the relative ease
of diversion and backrobbing appear to minimize the overall effect on
schedules. The P-3 SDLM line, for example, has a flow time of 57 days.
In the first quarter of FY79, the average actual turn-around- time was
58 days.
C. THE COMPONENT REWORK LINE
1. Introduction
The Component Line (the "F/E" line) is affected in a slightly
different manner by a material shortage. Much of the differences stem
from the type of work actually performed. The component workload task-
ing occurs two quarters in advance. However, unlike the aircraft main-
tenance line, the actual tasking varies widely due to changes in demand.
17

Weekly probes designate high priority work which override existing plans,
Further, these shops are the same shops that rework components for the
aircraft and engine lines.
It is difficult to describe a "typical component" at NARF,
Alameda. A wide range of components are included. Electronic items,
hydraulics, and structural fabrication all fall into this category.
For the purposes of this discussion, an electronic component will be
used as an example. Most of the comments would apply to other types
of components as well.
2. Description of Component Rework
The work flow for components is different from that described
earlier in the aircraft section. Most component rework does not flow
in a production line, but rather is a "workbench" arrangement. All
of the repair is accomplished by one individual and the component
remains at one location throughout the repair.
When a component is inducted, it is sent to the cognizant
shop, where a technician examines the component, determines the mal-
function, and orders the necessary materials for the repair. He then
places the component on the shelf until the parts come in. At that
time, the component is taken down from the shelf , re-examined and
repaired. The component is then tested, calibrated and sent from the
shop on to its destination.
The variability of the workload does complicate the task. Some
components are repaired constantly throughout the year. Others may
involve the repair of three units one quarter and then go for several
quarters before any others show up for repair.
18

Another special characteristic of component repair, particu-
larly electronic items, is that many repairs are sequential in nature.
For instance, initial testing may indicate that a particular circuit
board has failed. However, without that board, it is impossible to
check out other sections of the component. When the defective board
is replaced, other problems are discovered. This situation may require
several "sets" of requisitions and results in very long production times.
3. Effects of A Material Shortage
Cannibalization is common among components that experience
regular induction into NARF, Alameda. For example, there may be twenty
of a particular CLAMP (Closed Loop Aeronautical Material Program) item
undergoing repair at any one time. The technician will, in all like-
lihood, do anything possible to meet his production requirement or get
as close to it as is humanly possible.
No documentation is available to indicate how widespread the
practice may be. Exhibit (2) provides what backrobbing charges are
recorded in this area. Discussions with personnel in one shop indicate
that in CLAMP components, more components are cannibalized than are not.
Another problem is that, in general, each repair is different.
Certainly, some types of repairs frequently recur, however, each com-
ponent requires a different action. When the technician first receives
a component, it is tested and then set aside awaiting parts. By the
time the parts come in, the worker may have looked at dozens of the
same item. Although the test results and a description of the problem
are documented by the technician, it is hard to remember the exact cir-
cumstances associated with each particular component. There is some loss
of learning in this situation.
19

Finally, when the supply system status on requisition material
indicates that 100 percent of the required material will not be available
within thirty days, the component will be slated for "G" condition.
NAS Alameda maintains physical and financial custody of material in "G"
condition. When the component is designated to be in "G" condition,
the parts on order are normally cancelled, and will be reordered by
NAS, using a NAS requisition number and citing special accounting class
203 funds are required by ASO Instruction 4230.1. When all of the parts
are available, the component is reinducted. Exhibit (1) provides data
as to the size and changes in the "G" condition picture at NAS.
Transfer to "G" condition requires packaging and preservation
and some transportation expense. Each individual component must be
tracked through "G" condition as well which is a significant administra-
tive task. Reinduction into the NARF after all of the bit and piece
parts are available also depends on the NARF capability and desire to
work on that component at that particular time. The shops may be at
full capacity with high priority work, and if there is not any immediate
demand for the reinducted component, the NARF would not be anxious to
spend manhours on a component destined for stock.
A final consideration is that the components under repair may
be needed to support the aircraft or engine lines. Delays in component
repair, then, can impact schedules in other areas within NARF.
D. ENGINE LINE
1. Introduction
Under the Engine Analytical Maintenance Program (EAMP), engines
are no longer automatically completely overhauled, but rather each
20

maintenance action is designed to repair the particular failure which
occurred in that engine. Thus, each repair is slightly different.
Engine maintenance problems begin with the induction schedule.
As with the other programs, the workload planning occurs two quarters
in advance. However, while the quarterly workload is seen to be fairly
accurate, the weekly workload varies widely. For example, the work to
be performed during any given week depends on the engines arriving at
the NARF at the proper time. Generally, the NARF operates without a
backlog of NRFI engines on most programs. On the particular Friday
afternoon this author visited the engine facility, the production
personnel were unsure exactly what engines would be inducted the fol-
lowing Monday. The daily induction schedule specified which engine
model and series was expected in for repair, however, the actual
engines had not arrived at the NARF. The planners then examined those
engines which were available and in need of repair as well as the shop
manhour loading situation and inducted enough work to keep the shops
active on productive work. The planners indicated that, for some
engines, this situation is a regular occurrence.
2 . Description of the Maintenance
Once an engine is inducted, it is disassembled and the parts
are sent to the appropriate shops for cleaning, inspection, and repair.
New parts are requisitioned as necessary. After cleaning and repair
in the feeder shops, the components collect in a central stacker until
the production schedule calls for final assembly. The components are
then returned to the shop and the engine reassembled and tested. Each
engine is run up in a test cell to insure that it is functioning properly.
21

Any problem, whether or not connected to the work performed by the shop,
is investigated and repaired.
3. Effects of a Material Shortage
The engine programs have been experiencing continuing material
support problems. During the first quarter of FY 79 material support
problems were blamed for much of the labor hour variances incurred on
the J-52 and T-56 engine programs. The variance amounted to 3131 hours
on a base of 72,331 hours (4.3 percent). Further discussions revealed
that the most serious material problems were of a long term nature and
were well documented. One example presented concerned the T56, series
3, engine used in the P-3 and E-2 aircraft. One particular component,
the power unit turbine inlet case (2RH 2840-00-225-0953 DQ) , had been
available in January 1977 with a leadtime of about one month. In
February 1978, the leadtime stretched to about 12 months and currently
is about 15 months. As of August 1979, when 55 T56 engines were in
process, 26 were in a delay status due to the nonavailability of this
part.
This situation is only one of many similar examples that could
be presented. Material availability rather than material response
times is the major cause of material problems on the engine line.
Another characteristic of these engines is that parts usage
can be cyclical. As a particular engine model gets older, a component
which had had a very low failure rate over the years, may begin to fail
in nearly every engine. This puts a severe strain on the supply system
to keep up with the demand and can result in a procurement with months
of leadtime involved before delivery. Large fluctuations in demand
22

will cause shortages until the manufacturer's production and the supply
system can catch up.
As in the aircraft program, diversion and backrobbing are very
common, but no data is available to describe exactly such activity.
Exhibit (2) details the backrobbing charges which were recorded. The
mechanized stacker provides a ready pool of spares, however, the
administrative problems associated with cannibalization are more signif-
icant than in the aircraft program since the engine stacker is a manual
system. (The stacker is operated by several attendants that assign
storage locations and maintain handwritten records of the stacker's
contents and locations.)
But cannibalization has an additional negative impact which
is peculiar to the engine program. The standard procedure is to keep
all of the parts of an engine together as much as possible. A jet
engine is a delicate equipment built to close tolerances, however,
over time components tend to "wear together". A used component, still
within tolerances, may not work properly in another engine because
the parts are worn in a different manner. Theoretically, if cannibali-
zation increases, greater problems should be expected during testing.
A key decision point in the engine maintenance cycle occurs
at the point of final assembly. If, at that time, all of the components
are not available, the engine is transferred to "Code 94". This is an
administrative classification that involves little actual expense, except
that all work ceases on the engine until all of the parts required are





The engine parts do not leave the building but may require
minor preservation. As was the case for components in "G" condition,
the time that an engine is in "Code 94" does not count as a penalty
against the NARF. That is, the turn-around- time (TAT) statistics do
not include the amount of time that an engine is held in "Code 94".
(TAT) does not accumulate. During the first quarter of FY 79, the
average TAT was 33 days, while the average time an engine was at the




IV. LEVELS OF SERVICE
A. INTRODUCTION
Thus far, the types of work performed by NARF, Alameda have been
explained as well as the actions taken by the various divisions to
cope with the problem of material shortages.
Actually, material shortages can occur for three reasons. First,
material which is available locally may not be delivered quickly caus-
ing days of delay in production areas. Second, the material may not
be available locally even though it is available within the Navy's
supply system. This type of shortage causes delays as the material
is shipped to the NARF. Finally, the material may not be available
in the system at all. This requires a procurement action (with its
leadtime) a manufacturer's production run (with its leadtime) and
shipping (at its time).
B. MATERIAL AVAILABILITY
The question of material availability is one of stocking policies
and procedures. Evaluating possible alternatives to the current
system is beyond the scope of this research. However, the level of
material availability currently provided to the NARF by NAS was deter-
mined.
Exhibits (3) and (4) summarize the point of entry (POE) effective-
ness provided by NAS to the NARF for a three month period ending
31 March 1979. It shows that, for the material cognizance codes presented.
NARF, Alameda received only slightly more than 40 percent of all the
material it requisitions from NAS Supply.
25

To put this into perspective, consider the repair of a particular
component which requires four different parts. If it can be assumed
that the fact that NAS Supply has a particular part is independent of
it having any other part, then the probability of having all four parts
is the product of each separate probability. In this case, since the
overall effectiveness is .408, the probability of the NARF obtaining
all four parts from NAS is (.408) or .0277. Even if effectiveness is
raised to a .85 level, the probability of having all four parts is
4(.85) or .522. Of course, this includes only assets available immedi-
ately off the shelf at NAS and does not include stocks held at NSC,
Oakland or any other activity. But it does highlight the seriousness
of material availability and its importance to the overall industrial
effort.
C. CURRENT STANDARDS
Requisition and delivery response standards within the Department
of Defense are governed by the Uniform Material Movement and Issue
Priority System (UMMIPS) as set forth in OPNAV Instruction 4614.1 (series)
The UMMIPS standards, for example, prescribe how fast NSC Oakland should
respond to requisitions of various priorities. The last column of the
table shown below lists these standards.
NAS, Alameda and NARF, Alameda currently have an agreement which
commits NAS to respond to NARF requisitions much faster than the UMMIPS




Issue Group Priority NAS Standard NSC Standard
~ "~
(UMMIPS)
I 01-03 2 hours 2 days
II 04-08 4 hours 3 days
III 09-15 24 hours 11 days
The NAS standards are a result of a mid-1960 agreement between
NAS Supply and the NARF. At that time, the two activities were two
departments within the Air Station. The Supply Department maintained
approximately 26 individual storerooms which were co- located with the
shops in the depot. In an effort to reduce duplication and waste,
supply consolidated the stock in a central location but promised the
above delivery schedule to insure that service to the shops was not
degraded.
At this point, it will be helpful to examine the level of service
actually received by the NARF from both NSC, Oakland and NAS, Alameda.
To do this, requisition data extracted from the Demand History File
was used to track requisition processing time and delivery time. The
results of this analysis appear below:
NAS ALAMEDA
Total System Supply Point
Issue Group Response Time Response Time






Total System Supply Point
Issue Group Response Time Response Time
I 8.2 days 1.0 days
II 9.6 1.9
III 12.1 5.6
A detailed report of this analysis appears as Exhibit (5).
What this review indicates is that NAS does not appear to be
meeting the standards established for NARF support. The NAS does
respond faster than NSC Oakland, however. Of even greater interest
are the total requisition times which indicate that NARF, Alameda is
experiencing very long overall times, and that most of the delay is
internal to the NARF itself. On Priority 02 items, for example, NAS
made the issue and delivered the material to the customer in an average
of 0.2 days once NAS received the requisition. However, it took the
NARF an average of 3.6 days to process and release the requisition into
the system. It appears that major improvements in overall material
response times may be possible simply by improving procedures within
NARF, Alameda.
D. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES TO RESPONSE STANDARDS
The evaluation of the existing standards and of possible changes to
those standards was based on interviews and informal discussions with
NARF production and production control, and material planners. Although





The aircraft line personnel, who have more flexibility to over-
come material shortage problems were least impressed by suggestions of
possible improvement to deliveries of two to three hours for IG II
material. The planners this author talked to stated that the time
standard itself was not of great importance. It was much more critical
that whatever standard is established is met consistently. Overall,
material availability is much more critical than rapid response.
It was also believed that, since work-arounds and cannibaliza-
tion were readily available, the length of the production work on the
aircraft would not be different, that is, the turn-around- time for the
scheduled flow would not change.
While delivery time measured in hours is not critical for the
aircraft line, in general, the Flight Line might benefit from delivery
times of one or two hours. If an aircraft being tested just prior to
delivery to fleet develops a problem, it would be valuable to obtain
repair parts as quickly as possible. The parts may or may not be related
to the work performed by the NARF but may be for any repair necessary
for air-worthiness which must be made so that the aircraft can be tested.
There is no more "slack" in the schedule and any delay directly affects
completion. It is not clear how often this problem occurs, but when
it does, the parts required are now available through diversion, back-
robbing, or NAS supply. Which source of supply is used depends on the
specific part required and the schedule of the aircraft. It appears as
if diversion is the preferred action and that a decision between back-
robbing or NAS supply is based on either requisition status or the exper-
ience of the personnel involved as to best method of filling the requirement,
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It is likely that the demands would be highly random and that the range
of items demanded is broad.
2 . Component Line
Suggestion of response times of two or three hours for IG I
and II brought mixed responses in the component area. The primary
point raised was that unless the supply effectiveness was 100 percent,
such time standard would be meaningless. The technicians were quick
to state that it would not accomplish anything to have 85 percent of
the parts available in two hours, and then have to wait for three weeks
for the remaining 15 percent.
It was noted, however, that since some of the repairs are se-
quential in nature, a quick response to unforeseen secondary require-
ments would be of great value. Even if the bulk of parts were available
in three weeks, the technician, when he assembled the unit, may discover
that he needs one more item to finish the job. A quick response on that
final item could allow timely completion of the unit and avoid another
three week delay.
The production control center was concerned about "G" condition
material. It was believed that more logical and timely decisions could
be made about committing items to "G" condition if adequate information
was available early concerning requisition status and material availa-
bility. Currently, the production control centers prepare the requisi-
tions and send them to the material control centers where the requisition
datai is checked, verified, and keypunched for transmission to NAS Supply.
The production control center does not know whether spe cific parts are
currently available from the NIF stores or NAS or NSC. Requisition
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status is considered to be unreliable and slow. It was considered
normal not to receive status on a requisition for 10 to 12 days after
submission.
3 . Engine Maintenance
The response to proposed delivery times of two or three hours
was mixed in the engine area as well. This was probably due to the
fact that the biggest problems faced were that the engine division are
ones of material availability rather than response times.
Of the short time problems, one area of concern was informa-
tion about material availability. The shop personnel needed to know
what material was available and at what locations so that a logical
cannibalization decision could be made. As in the component areas,
the production control center and the production supervisor do not know
if a particular part is available in NIF stores, at NAS , or at NSC.
Armed with the right information, proper decisions about cannibalization
could be reached.
One question posed to a production supervisor was "Given the
situation that you could have a new part available in three hours,
would you wait for a part from supply or divert the part from another
engine?" The immediate response was to divert the part. The reasoning
was tha t
:
a. production was in control of a diversion and therefore the
extent of the delay was within his sphere of control,
b. he was skeptical that supply could deliver and that he was
unable to find out in advance that immediate delivery was possible, and
c. completing the engine was his primary objective.
Although this was only one individual opinion, it appears that more than
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a fast response time from NSC Oakland will be necessary to gain efficiency
in this area. Customer confidence and ability to impact the system will
be important factors.
As in the components, it was stressed that 100 percent supply
effectiveness is required before work can be completed. Rapid response
on 85 percent of the parts requisitioned will not yield marked changes




This thesis has attempted to determine the effects of a material
shortage on production of an industrial activity. A brief overview
of the business base for NARF, Alameda was presented as background and
various approaches used by the different divisions to cope with material
shortages have been explained.
NARF, Alameda suffers from material shortages in much the same
manner as any commercial industrial plant. There are work stoppages,
work-arounds , worker inefficiency, and administrative problems such as
rescheduling and planning. All of the above items adversely affect
efficiency and therefore the cost of doing business.
The Navy, as a whole, suffers from delays in production. Customer
units may experience degraded service such as grounded aircraft and
impaired mission capability. More material in delay requires more
material in the pipeline to prevent service degradation.
The production divisions cope with these problems largely by divert-
ing RFI parts from one inventory to another. The other method is to
backrob a part from a unit which is not operational to allow another
unit to become so.
These two actions will sustain production temporarily, but they have
costs associated with them. Cannibalization increases the risk of
damaging good material and it increases the administrative workload by
requiring tracking and rescheduling.
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Examination of the processes and discussion with the people involved
leads this author to the following conclusions:
(1) The cost accounting system currently does not capture the cost,
duration, or nature of a material shortage delay in any program.
(2) The type of production currently underway at NARF, Alameda
does not require delivery times of less than 12 hours. Standards
that guarantee two or four hour delivery are, at this point, not
necessary. Neither the production efficiency nor the material pipeline
would change significantly if such a standard were met.
Improvements to the existing system should address, as a minimum,
the following points:
(1) Material Availability. The material shortage problems that
appear to have the greatest effect are ones of material availability
rather than slow local delivery.
(2) Information. NARF personnel making production decisions need
accurate and complete material availability information in order to
make intelligent production decisions.
(3) Actual Performance. Overnight delivery appears to be sufficient
for normal situations. This standard should measure the time from the
point at which the material requirement is identified by production
control personnel until the material is physically at the production
control center and ready for use. It is important that the standard be
met. The people using the system must have confidence that it will work.
NSC, Oakland and NARF, Alameda should continue to work together to reduce




G Condition Material Status
G Condition Components




















Dollar Value of G Condition Material ($ millions)
Components 27.0 28.6






NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY, ALAMEDA
BACKROBBING CHARGES
(Indirect - Account "MB")
Code Charges; (hours) TOTAL
6/30/78 9/30/78 12/31/78 3/31/79
520 831 457 321 24 1633
650 43 8 40 91
660 7 7
930 1203 1088 542 948 3781
940 453 201 828 2966 4448
950 8133 9233 6888 8083 32337
960 781 596 462 819 2658
44955
Note: At the standard labor rate of $13.05 per hour,




NAS ALAMEDA SUPPLY POE EFFECTIVENESS
FOR
NARF ALAMEDA
(JAN 79 - MAR 79)





















"BIG FIVE" SSD COGS (9C, 9D, 9G, 9N AND 9Z) 40.8
40.0 36.8 20.0 31.8
34.3 35.4 34.2 34.6
58.1 76.3 40.0 56.3
50.0 14.3 42.9 35.0
26.1 18.5 32.3 24.9
47.7 40.9 44.7 44.4
40.0 20.0 40.0 33.3
2.3 6.3 8.7 6.3
30.5 26.4 30.3 28.8
10.9 3.6 0.0 5.0
35.6 37.0 35.2 35.9
11.8 0.0 0.0 6.3
54.3 47.9 49.9 50.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
42.4 45.3 34.3 40.5
28.0 25.4 34.6 29.9
34.6 34.2 58.8 42.9
45.2 42.8 43.7 43.8
50.0 59.9 55.2 55.7




NAS ALAMEDA POE DEMANDS
FROM
NARF ALAMEDA
(JAN 79 - MAR 79)
COG JAN FEB MAR TOTAL
9A 10 19 15 44
9C 915 975 1066 2956
9D 31 38 50 119
9E 6 7 7 20
9F 92 157 124 373
9G 837 867 1098 2802
9H 5 5 5 15
91 44 63 69 176
9J 325 432 356 1113
9K 46 28 46 120
9N 2261 2256 2846 7363
90 17 5 10 32
9Q 645 974 984 2603
9S 5 1 -- 6
9V 628 894 864 2386
9W 50 59 78 187
9Y 26 38 34 98
9Z 4374 5065 5244 14683
1H 98 157 183 438
1R 2489 2984 3580 9053
2R 173 271 309 753
5R 214 140 58 412
6R 11 6 5 22
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